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Abstract 
Inclusive business models combine profitability with the potential for poverty reduction by 
linking smallholders with markets. This report analyses three business models relevant for 
sorghum and millets in east and southern Africa. These are: The Warehouse Receipt 
System operated by Lesiolo Grain Handlers Limited (LGHL) (Kenya), the contract sorghum 
grower model operated by Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd (SLS) (Kenya), and the contract 
finger millet grower system operated by the LEAD Project (Uganda). The performance of 
these business models was evaluated in terms of their design, profitability, and 
inclusiveness. The WRS is a producer-driven model that depends on the willingness and 
ability of producers to store grain until prices rise. The case-study of the WRS operated by 
LGHL showed low uptake by maize growers due to constraints imposed by low awareness 
among growers, a minimum 10 t threshold of grain accepted for storage, and the distance to 
the store. In 2011, only 600t of maize entered the WRS from five farmer groups. Although 
the WRS was profitable for maize growers, the seasonal rise in prices was much lower for 
sorghum and millets, which greatly reduced the potential benefits of WRS for these crops. A 
recent survey of participants showed that the WRS was inclusive, with high rates of 
participation from small maize producers and from women. The Smart Logistics business 
model is a buyer-driven model driven by the growing market for clear sorghum beer. Smart 
Logistics acts as an intermediary for the brewery industry, supplying seed to producer 
groups, monitoring quality, and offering higher prices than local brokers. The model is 
profitable for growers, intermediary, and buyer. Volumes supplied to the industry have grown 
but are still not sufficient to meet demand. The model is inclusive with the majority of 
producers belonging to all-female groups, and collective farming to reduce unit costs. Of the 
three models studied, this has the greatest potential. The LEAD business model was 
designed to provide Unga Millers Ltd in Nairobi with an annual supply of 6,000 t of finger 
millet. However, the model proved unworkable. No finger millet was ever delivered. The 
business model was profitable for Ugandan growers and for the buyer. The model was also 
inclusive, with finger millet supplied smallholders organized in producer organizations, where 
almost half the members were women. However, the model failed because it was 
intermediary-driven. Changes to the original design by the LEAD management team delayed 
the start of the project while the small company appointed to bulk, clean, and ship finger 
millet to Nairobi was unfit for this role. 
 
Keywords: Business Models, Dryland Cereals, Sorghum, Millets 
JEL classification: O200 
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1. Introduction 
Smallholders in Africa have limited access to markets. Attempts to overcome this market 
failure have resulted in several innovative business models. These include collective 
marketing to reduce transaction costs, negotiate forward contracts, and earn higher prices 
for growers, Warehouse Receipt Systems (WRS) that allow smallholders to store 
commodities until prices rise, and contract farming that provides buyers with a reliable 
supply of high quality products, and links growers directly to buyers. However, experience 
with these business models has been largely confined to high-value export crops. There is 
limited knowledge on the performance of these models with lower-value, staple food crops. 
This report reviews experience with innovative business models for sorghum and millets in 
East and Southern Africa (ESA). The review is based on three case-studies, which were 
purposively selected because of their relevance for sorghum and millets, scale of operations, 
and the availability of information.1  
The report focuses on three research questions about the business models under review: 
1. How do they work? 
2. How profitable are they? 
3. How inclusive are they? 
2. Objectives 
The general objective of this report is to evaluate the design and performance of three 
inclusive business models linking smallholders to markets. 
The three specific objectives are to: 
1. Describe the design of these business models; 
2. Evaluate the profitability of these business models; and  
3. Assess the inclusiveness of these business models. 
  
 
1
 Other recent studies include case studies of four business models in ESA by COMPETE (2011) and 
the mid-term evaluation of the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme (WFP, 2011). 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
A business model describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and 
captures value (Osterwalder, 2006). An inclusive business model has been defined as: 
“Business models which do not leave behind small-scale farmers and in which the voices 
and needs of those actors in developing countries are recognized” (Vorley et al., 2009: 187) 
Hence, inclusive business models are designed to deliver mutual benefits for private 
business (generating sales and profit growth) and for low-income communities (creating jobs 
and increasing incomes). Inclusive business models may take several forms. Figure 1 shows 
a typology of business models for agricultural value chains. 
 Model 1: Individual Smallholders in Spot Markets. This is the most common 
market model for African smallholders. Growers sell individually to informal buyers, 
usually traders or middlemen that buy at the farm gate. Prices are generally low 
because growers are scattered, sell small quantities, and because buyers face high 
transaction costs. Buyers sell to processors, retailers, and wholesalers for sale in the 
informal retail sector.  
 Model 2: Organized Smallholders in Spot Markets. Growers are organized into 
groups for purchase of inputs and marketing. Groups sell directly to retailers and 
wholesalers, reducing transaction costs. Collective marketing allows growers to 
negotiate higher prices than selling individually.  
 Model 3: Contract Farming. The most common form of this model is the out grower 
scheme in which a nucleus commercial estate sub-contracts production to 
smallholders. Buyers or processors provide inputs and technical advice to 
smallholders who are contracted to sell at a fixed price, or a floor price adjusted after 
harvest. The estate bulks and processes the crop for sale after harvest. Products are 
usually sold through the formal retail sector (e.g. local supermarkets) that may 
demand high quality standards.   
 Model 4: Integrated Agribusiness. In this model, production is fully owned and 
controlled by the buyer and processor. There is no separation between grower and 
buyer. Products are sold through the formal retail sector. However, a second version 
of this model may include smallholders who share ownership of the business through 
equity or trust funds. 
An alternative typology of inclusive business models focuses on the motivations of the 
dominant partner (Table 1). This categorization goes beyond model design to focus on the 
roles of specific actors and their objectives. This categorization is useful because these 
variables are important determinants of model performance. The opportunities and threats 
facing these models are very different (Vorley et al., 2009). The typology therefore provides 
a useful tool for the analysis of project performance.  
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Figure 1: Typology of business models linking smallholders to markets  
Source: Haggblade et al., (2012). 
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Table 1: Typology of business model drivers 
Type Driver Objectives 
Producer-driven Smallholders New markets 
Higher market price 
Buyer-driven Large farmers 
Processors 
Exporters 
Retailers 
Stabilize market position 
Increase supply 
Assure supply 
 
Intermediary-driven Traders, wholesalers 
NGOs and other support 
agencies 
Supply more discerning 
customers 
‘Make markets work for the 
poor’ 
Source: Vorley et al. (2009).   
In ESA, inclusive business models for agriculture have adopted Models 2 and 3 (Figure 1). 
Model 3 has been used in value chains for high value crops, particularly crops with large 
export markets, such as coffee, tea, flowers (Barrett et al., 2012), horticulture (Neven et al., 
2009; Rao and Quaim, 2011), and milk (IFAD, 2010). Experience with inclusive business 
models for low-value staple food crops is more limited. However, recent studies include the 
Cereal Growers Association (CGA) in Kenya and Tanzania, Farm Concern International 
(FCI) in Kenya and Uganda, and the Agricultural Market Development Trust (AGMARK) in 
Kenya and Uganda (COMPETE, 2011). A common feature of these models is the provision 
of grain storage and market information for cereal growers. Several inclusive business 
models target markets for farm inputs. These include the Real IPM Company, a private 
company in Kenya, which markets Gro-Plus, a 500 g seed-treatment pack for small farmers, 
and the Farm Input Promotion-Africa, a not-for-profit company that markets small, affordable 
packs of seed and fertilizers (Hall et al., 2010).  
4. Data and Methods 
The report is based on three main types of evidence. First, we conducted personal 
interviews with key informants. The interviews were made using a checklist that covered the 
three specific research objectives (design, profitability, inclusion). For the Smart Logistics 
case study, we interviewed growers at the Maliku collection center, Kitui district. We 
interviewed representatives (secretaries and chairpersons) of three farmer groups (Wendo 
wa Maliku, Walanyo and Kalimani Self Help Groups), and conducted a Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) on their experience with Smart Logistics Ltd and developed a partial 
budget for sorghum production. The LEAD case study was based on interviews with former 
LEAD staff, either in person or by telephone. A list of persons met and/or contacted is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
Secondly, we collected relevant reports, documents, and statistical information either directly 
from the key informants, or the internet. The Warehouse Receipt System operated by 
Lesiolo Grain Handlers Limited was the subject of a recent MSc. thesis (Mutai, 2011). The 
reference year for the data collected was 2009. With permission from the author, our 
discussion uses information from this source. 
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Thirdly, we reviewed relevant literature on innovative business models, with particular 
reference to experience in ESA. 
The profitability of the business models was evaluated using gross margin analysis, MRR, 
ROI and benefit cost ratio. The marginal rate of return (MRR) which measures the change in 
net benefits (marginal net benefits) divided by the change in costs (marginal costs). The 
MRR indicates what farmers can expect to gain in return when they decide to change from 
one practice to another. The Return on Investment (ROI) is estimated as the net benefits 
divided by the costs. The ROI estimates the returns the grower is expected to gain after 
investing in the variable costs of production and sale. The benefit-cost ratio measures the 
gross returns divided by total variable costs. 
5. Lesiolo Grain Handlers Ltd., Kenya 
5.1 Design 
The company 
Lesiolo Grain Handlers Limited (LGHL) is a private company registered in 1999 which 
started operations in 2003. It provides post-harvest management for wheat, maize, barley, 
and sorghum. LGHL has two depots where grain is stored, one in Lanet and a second site in 
Nakuru leased from the National Cereal Produce Board (NCPB). LGHL provides services in 
the drying, cleaning, fumigation, bagging, and storing of grain. Apart from these services, 
LGHL also buys wheat, maize, sorghum, beans and soybeans from farmers for sale to local 
processing companies. Their biggest single customer is East African Breweries Limited 
(EABL) and barley accounts for 80% of the volume of crops that they store. LGHL was the 
first operator to be certified by Eastern Africa Grain Council (EAGC) to offer a Warehouse 
Receipt System (WRS) in Kenya. This system has been operational since 2007. Originally 
the WRS was only for wheat but now includes maize. Currently it does not include sorghum 
or millets. 
The business model 
Under the WRS suppliers must deposit a minimum 10 t maize or wheat into certified LGHL 
silos.  LGHL then gives them a warehouse receipt (WR) which the suppliers may present to 
Equity Bank for credit, using the WR as collateral. This allows growers to store their crop 
until prices rise in order to sell. The bank offers up to 80% of the value of the stored with a 
constant Interest rate of 12% for farmers (a rate below the market rate of 23%). The 
depositor may be a producer, farmer group, trader, exporter, processor or indeed any 
individual or corporate body. The Warehouse Operator (WO) holds the stored commodity by 
way of safe custody, meaning they are legally liable to make good any value lost through 
theft or damage by fire and other catastrophes but they have no legal or beneficial interest in 
the commodity. 
Figure 2 shows the nine steps in the WRS process: 
1. The grower transports the grain to a certified warehouse. On delivery, the grain is 
checked to ensure that it meets the stipulated quality standards. 
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2. If the grain passes the quality inspection and the quantity is above the 10 t minimum 
set by the WO, the WO stores the grain and issues a WR to the depositor. 
3. The grower presents the WR to a bank. 
4. The bank offers the grower short-term financing, which is a proportion of the market 
value of the grain deposited in the warehouse. The WR remains with the bank.  
5. When market prices improve, the grower sells the grain and the buyer is instructed to 
pay directly to the bank.  
6. Once the buyer has paid the bank, the bank provides the buyer with a copy of the 
WR. 
7. The buyer presents the WR to the WO. 
8. The WO gives the grain to the buyer. 
9. The bank deducts the loan and interest from the cash deposited by the buyer, and 
the WO recovers the storage charges. The grower then receives the balance.   
                    Cash balance (9) 
      Credit (4)             Grain (1)   
         
       WR (3)                                                    WR (2) 
 
        
 
 
 
                                
                               
 
                          
                        Cash/Cheque (5)                                          WR (7) 
                                                                                                         
                         WR (6)                                                         Grain (8) 
          
Figure 2: Warehouse Receipt System, Lesiolo Grain Handlers Ltd, Kenya, 2012 
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5.2 Profitability  
Gross margin analysis 
The profitability of the WRS for growers depends on several variables: 
1. The difference in the price of grain between storage and sale; 
2. The cost of delivery and storage; and 
3. The cost of interest charged by the bank. 
The profitability of the WRS can be compared with two alternatives: instant sale after harvest 
and own storage in a locally-made granary. Instant sale occurs mostly within the first month 
after harvesting. During this period, traders and middlemen travel round the farms with 
lorries buying produce at low prices. The farmers have limited powers of negotiation and the 
traders are the sole price setters. Farmers’ urgent need for cash leaves them with no 
alternative except to sell their crop at a low price determined by the trader, even though they 
know that prices will rise. Other farmers take the initiative to store their grain in their own 
granary or in a rented store. However, the pressing need for cash may force them to sell 
before prices reach their peak. By contrast, by offering finance to meet their cash needs 
before they sell their grain, the WRS offers growers an incentive to wait until prices are 
highest. On average, own storage was carried out for two months before the farmers sold 
their maize (Mutai, 2011). Unlike instant sale, growers incur some transport cost taking the 
maize to market and other costs associated with storage.  
Table 2 compares the profitability of WRS with the profitability either direct sale after harvest 
or own storage followed by sale when prices rise. The profitability of WRS was based on a 
storage period of six months, to allow sale when prices peak. The results show that: 
1. Instant sale had the lowest gross margin (273 KS/bag). 
2. The gross margin for own storage for two months was three times higher than the 
gross margin for instant sale (811 KS/bag). 
3. The gross margin for WRS for six months (1146 KS/bag) was four times the gross 
margin for instant sale. 
4. The added cost of WRS was 282 KS/bag, or 12 % of the gross benefits (2312 
KS/bag). 
Despite higher costs, therefore, the WRS model was more profitable than instant sale or own 
storage.  
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Table 2: Partial budget for WRS, Lesiolo Grain Handlers Ltd., 20092 
 Months Total 
  1 2 3 4 5 6   
Instant sale               
Benefits 1157 - - - - - 1157 
Production cost 884 - - - - - 884 
Gross Margin 273 - - - - - 273 
Own storage        
Benefits - 1910 - - - - 1910 
Production cost 884 - - - - - 884 
Transport cost - 50 - - - - 50 
Fumigation 15 - - - - - 15 
Storage losses - 100 - - - - 100 
Rent on stores 25 25 - - - - 50 
Gross Margin -924 1735 - - - - 811 
WRS        
Benefits - - - - - 2312 2312 
Production cost 884 - - - - - 884 
Storage costs 9 9 9 9 9 9 54 
Fumigation  - - 10 - - 10 20 
Loading  - - - - - 10 10 
Offloading  10 - - - - - 10 
Transport  50 - - - - - 50 
Interest on loan - - - - - 138 138 
Gross Margin -953 -9 -19 -9 -9 2145 1146 
Source: Lesiolo Grain Handlers & Mutai (2011) 
 
Marginal Rate of Return  
Table 3 shows the MRR for the three alternatives methods of sale. The results show that the 
WRS gave a higher rate of return (4.1) than own storage (3.5) when growers switched from 
instant sale. For every additional shilling invested in the WRS, the grower will recover the 
shilling and earn a return of KS 4.1.  
 
2
 Figures in Kenyan Shillings per 90 kg bag of maize (Exchange rate 1US$=77Ksh) 
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Table 3: Marginal Rate of Return (MRR), WRS 
  Instant sale Own storage WRS 
Revenue 1157 1910 2312 
Variable Costs 884 1099 1166 
∆ in revenue from instant sale  753 402 
∆ in costs from instant sale  215 282 
MRR  3.5 4.1 
Source: Table 2 Figures in Kenyan Shillings per 90 kg bag of maize 
Profitability for sorghum 
The profitability for warehouse storage of sorghum and millet was estimated by comparing 
the seasonal price changes for these crops with that for maize. To compare prices, we used 
the period for the “short rains” (October-December) in eastern Kenya, which is the main 
growing season for sorghum and millets.
3
 We compared prices after harvesting and three 
weeks’ drying (February), two months after harvest (April) and six months after harvest (July) 
for the three crops. Prices are wholesale prices for the calendar year 2011. Figure 3 shows 
that six months after harvest, the wholesale price of sorghum had risen by 21%, while the 
price of millets had risen by 12 %. By contrast, the price of maize had risen by 158%. Two 
months after harvest, the price of sorghum and millets had risen by only 2-17 % compared 
with 47 % for maize. This suggests that the seasonal price rises for sorghum and millets in 
Kenya are not high enough to justify storage through the WRS.  
 
3
 The “long rains” are normally from March to May, but these are not reliable and rarely occur in 
eastern Kenya. Most grain production in 2011 in Kenya was in the short rains  (October – 
December). 
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Prices (KS/kg) Change in price (%) 
Instant sale Own storage WRS Own storage  WRS 
Month of sale February April July April July  
Maize 19 28 49 47 158 
Sorghum 29 34 35 17 21 
Millet 50 51 56 2 12 
 
Figure 3: Weekly wholesale prices for maize, sorghum, and millet, Kenya 2011. 
Source: RATIN website 
5.3 Inclusion  
The inclusiveness of the business model was evaluated by previous research, based on a 
random sample of 178 farm households in Mauche and Gilgil divisions, Nakuru district, 
surveyed in 2010 (Mutai, 2011). Of the maize growers surveyed, 73 % were aware of the 
WRS. This figure was below expected given that the WRS system was introduced in 2007 
and that the survey was conducted in Nakuru county where LHGL is located. Low 
awareness may reflect limited publicity for the system. Of those aware of the WRS, 39 % did 
not participate. This figure is higher than those who were aware and participated. 
Table 4 compares socio-economic indicators between households participating and not 
participating in the WRS. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Ja
n
 (
W
k 
1)
Ja
n
 (
W
k 
3)
Ja
n
/F
e
b
 (
W
k
 5
)
Fe
b
 (
W
k 
7
)
Fe
b
/M
a
r 
(W
k 
9
)
M
a
r 
(W
k 
1
1
)
M
a
r/
A
p
r 
(W
k 
1
3)
A
p
r 
(W
k 
1
5
)
A
p
r 
(W
k 
1
7
)
M
a
y 
(W
k 
1
9)
M
a
y 
(W
k 
2
1)
Ju
n
 (
W
k 
2
3
)
Ju
n
 (
W
k 
2
5
)
Ju
l (
W
k 
2
7
)
Ju
l (
W
k 
2
9
)
Ju
l/
A
u
g 
(W
k 
3
1
)
A
u
g 
(W
k 
3
3
)
A
u
g/
Se
p
 (
W
k 
3
5)
Se
p
 (
W
k 
3
7)
Se
p
 (
W
k 
3
9)
O
ct
 (
W
k 
4
1)
O
ct
 (
W
k 
4
3)
N
o
v 
(W
k 
45
)
N
o
v 
(W
k 
47
)
D
e
c 
(W
k 
4
9
)
D
e
c 
(W
k 
5
1
)
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
e
e
kl
y 
w
h
o
le
sa
le
 p
ri
ce
s 
(K
S/
kg
) 
Sorghum Maize Millet
Inclusive Business Models for Sorghum and Millets: Three Case Studies  
 
                                                                            ICRISAT - Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 11 
Table 4: Socio-economic differences between WRS participants and non-participants  
Socio-economic 
indicator 
Participants  
(n=48) 
Non-participants 
(n=130) 
All households 
(n=178) 
Household size (no.) 4.8 5.2 5.1 
Female-headed 
households (no.) 
18 37 55 
Member of Farmer 
Group (no.) 
38 25 63 
Farm size (acres) 4.3 3.8 3.9 
Area planted to maize 
(acres) 
2.9 2.5 3.5 
Maize harvested (90 
kg bags) 
21.4 15.2 16.9 
Distance to 
warehouse (km) 
29 41 37 
Source: Mutai (2011): 23-24. 
Multivariate analysis revealed that the farm household’s decision to participate in the WRS 
depended on several variables. The variables that positively affected participation were:  
1. Female-headed household 
2. Membership of a farmer group 
3. Area planted to maize 
4. Value of off-farm income 
By contrast, participation was negatively affected by the distance between the household 
and the warehouse. 
Eighty percent of households using the WRS belonged to a group, compared to 19 % that 
did not participate. Since female-headed households were more likely to be members of a 
farmer group, they were also more likely to participate in the WRS. Access to off-farm 
income also facilitated use of the WRS by providing households with alternative sources of 
income and reducing the need for instant sale of maize after harvest.   
Farmers were also asked what they considered the major challenge preventing participation 
in the WRS (Table 5). Among non-participants, 70 % reported the greatest challenge to be 
transporting maize to the warehouse. Recent increases in fuel prices have resulted in a rapid 
increase in transport costs. Poor road infrastructure might be another reason for the high 
transport costs charged to farmers which bars them from participating in the WRS. Fifty-
three percent cited low farm productivity as a challenge to participation. Since the 
warehouse operator requires at least 10 t to offer this service, low maize production means 
that growers cannot raise the volumes required for storage in the WRS. Half the non-
participants mentioned grain quality as an important challenge. However, only 22 % blamed 
challenges with running farmer groups as a reason for non-participation. 
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Table 5: Factors constraining participation in WRS (% non-participants reporting) 
Constraints Yes  
(n=130) 
Transport 70 
Low farm productivity 53 
Attaining maize quality 50 
Financial challenges 27 
Farmer group challenges 22 
Source: Mutai (2011): pp33 
 
6. Smart Logistics Solutions Limited, Kenya 
6.1 Design 
The company 
Smart Logistics Ltd. started operations in 2006 as a small-scale business buying sorghum 
from farmers and selling to East African Maltings Limited (EAML) for brewing, which supplies 
malt to beer. Rose Mutuku, the director, was formerly procurement manager for East African 
Breweries Limited (EABL). Over time, the company has found more buyers but EAML still 
remains its major client. The company currently has four major buyers: EAML (sorghum), 
Nutrofood (soybeans) and World Food Programme (WFP) through the Purchase for 
Progress (P4P) programme (sorghum, beans and maize). Smart Logistics mainly buys crops 
on contract and not through the open market. 
Through a grant from the Market Linkages Initiative (MLI) funded by USAID, Smart Logistics 
managed to build eight village aggregation centers (each with a capacity of 200 t.) which 
smallholders use to bulk their sorghum. Smart Logistics has also constructed a grain bulking 
center in Machakos with a capacity of 10,000 t. When the company started in 2009 it 
supplied just 20 t of sorghum. In 2011, Smart Logistics handled 2,000 t of sorghum, of which 
1,500 t came directly from growers and 500 t came from its own appointed agents. 
The business model 
To maximize volumes, Smart Logistics uses two sources of supply. The first source of 
supply is a smallholder out grower model, known as the COBO: CO-Community, B-Based, 
O-Out growers, S-Structure. In this model growers are organized into groups with at least 15 
members. Ten farmer groups come together to form a set, referred to as a production unit. 
Each member of a production unit is expected to grow at least two acres of sorghum. Five 
production units form one COBO. The 10 farmer groups each nominate a representative for 
the COBO committee. Each COBO has a field officer employed by Smart Logistics, who 
supports the members of the COBO and links with the Ministry of Agriculture that provides 
extension services to the groups. The field officer holds pre-planting, pre-harvest and post-
harvest meetings with growers. Before planting, the officer distributes seeds, the cost to be 
deducted after harvesting. In the post-harvest meeting, a review of what happened during 
the season is made. 
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The second source of supply is buying agents, appointed by Smart Logistics, who buy 
sorghum at a price lower than that offered by Smart Logistics to members of the COBO, but 
higher than the price offered by brokers. The role of the agent in this model is to:  
1. Help to create price uniformity in the sorghum market; 
2. Function as an alternative bank, where the farmer has pressing cash needs; and 
3. Help accumulate the volumes required by Smart Logistics. 
Once the growers have harvested they sell their sorghum to Smart Logistic marketing 
agents, or through the Smart Logistic voucher system. In the voucher system, the farmer 
delivers sorghum to the aggregation center, which may either be one of the eight permanent 
centers or a satellite center rented for the harvest season. At the aggregation center, the 
field officers make quality checks, which include checking the amount of foreign matter, the 
size of the seeds and the color (the recommended color is white), after which the grain is 
weighed and bagged. Once satisfied with the quality, the field officer issues the grower with 
a receipt. The receipt has three main components: bio-data of the grower; payment 
instruction details (names, account No., bank and branch names); production (the quantity, 
quality, and net value of the sorghum sold by the grower). Each aggregation center has 600 
– 1,000 farmers with at least two acres planted to sorghum. The target volume of sorghum 
for each center is a minimum of 10 t. Last season, however, the volume of sorghum 
collected per an aggregation center was between three and five tons.  
Based on the receipts issued by Smart Logistics, farmers are paid by the Equity and Co-
operative banks. Each receipt has a unique WR which Smart Logistics sends to the bank as 
an instruction for payment. The receipt has three copies: farmers, accountants, and a book 
copy. The farmer then issues the receipt to the bank for payments or the money can be 
directly deposited to the farmers’ bank account if the farmer has an account. After delivery, it 
takes approximately seven days before payments are made, though sometimes payment is 
delayed up to one month. These delays could be as a result of capital needs of the company 
or field delays, where the field officer delays to take the receipts to the office in time due to 
the aggregation activities. By contrast, agents pay on the spot and hence supplement the 
company’s working capital. 
Sorghum aggregated from the different collection centers and agents is brought to Smart 
Logistics’ bulking center in Machakos. Smart Logistics makes a contract with each 
set/production unit and a Local Purchase Order (LPO) is issued to the set. At the moment, 
SLC has 10 sets. The sorghum is shipped to East African Maltings (EAML) in Nairobi, which 
supplies quality raw materials in the form of malt, barley and sorghum to the brewing units of 
East African Breweries Limited (EABL). EAML have their own laboratories in which they test 
sorghum for quality. EAML encourages sorghum suppliers to bring a sample for testing to 
ensure that quality standards are maintained. Payment is made within 15 working days after 
delivery through the bank.  
The European Cooperative for Rural Development (EUCORD) coordinates the supply of 
sorghum to EAML through a number of partners, including Smart Logistics, AFRICA 
Harvest, and others. 
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6.2 Profitability  
Smart Logistics 
Table 5 shows the costs incurred by Smart Logistics in sourcing and shipping sorghum to 
EAML in Nairobi. Smart Logistics delivers sorghum to EAML at a price of 30 KS/kg and buys 
the same from farmers at 22 KS/kg. Total costs average 6 KS/kg, and the estimated mark-up 
for Smart Logistics is 2 KS/kg of sorghum. However, this margin may be reduced by hidden 
and unforeseen costs, such as illegal payments at police check-posts, payments to the local 
council, vehicle breakdowns during transportation (shipping is outsourced to private 
contractors). Profits therefore depend on maximizing the volume of sorghum supplied.  
 
Figure 4: Smart Logistics business model (2012) 
  
Bank 
(payments
) 
Bulking Centre 
(SL offices) 
Farmers 
Village 
Aggregation 
Centers  
(Voucher 
system) 
EAML (Client) 
Agents  
(Spot cash) 
EUCORD 
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Table 6: Smart Logistics business model costs (2012) 
Variable costs Costs (Ks/bag) Percent 
Transport  90 16.7 
Cess 45 8.3 
Aggregation  90 16.7 
Loading & offloading 90 16.7 
Weighing & packaging 90 16.7 
Administration 90 16.7 
Handling losses (pouring, weight loss) 45 8.3 
Total  540 100.0 
Source: Smart Logistics Figures are in Kenyan Shillings per 90 kg bag of sorghum 
Growers 
Profitability for growers was estimated through a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with 
farmers selling sorghum to the Smart Logistics in the Maliku aggregation center in Kitui, 
Eastern Province. The FGD was conducted in mid-September 2012 when the crop had been 
harvested. Farmers grew sorghum both individually and collectively. In collective farming, 
growers rented land, and threshing and winnowing were done collectively. By contrast, in 
individual farming, threshing and winnowing is done by community work parties known as 
muethya, for which the farmer has to provide a variety of food and provide local brew. 
Individual farmers sold sorghum either to a private broker or to Smart Logistics, whereas 
collective farmers sold only to Smart Logistics.  
Table 7 shows partial budgets for these three scenarios. Budgets are presented for both a 
cash-cost and full-cost basis, which includes the imputed cost of family labour. The results 
show that: 
1. The gross margin for growers was significantly higher when selling to Smart Logistics 
than when selling to brokers. For example, on a cash-cost basis, the gross margin for 
individual farmers was six times higher selling to Smart Logistics (1,122 KS/bag 
compared to 190 KS/bag selling to brokers) 
2. Higher gross margins selling to Smart Logistics reflected the higher price paid to 
growers (22 KS/kg) compared to the price paid by brokers (12 KS/kg). 
3. Gross margins for group farming were higher than for individual farming, whether 
calculated on a cash or full-cost basis. Ploughing and transport costs are lower for 
group farming since these services are provided by group members who offer a 
lower charge to the group.  
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Table 7: Partial budgets for sorghum, 2012 season  
 Method Full-cost basis Cash-cost basis 
 Type of farming Individual Group Individual Group 
 Buyer SL Brokers SL SL Brokers SL 
Revenue 1,980 1,080 1,980 1,980 1,080 1,980 
Land clearing 80 80 80 40 40 40 
Ploughing 200 200 100 200 200 100 
Seeds 48 50 48 48 50 48 
Planting 40 40 40 0 0 0 
Bird scaring 300 300 300 0 0 0 
1st  weeding 160 160 160 160 160 0 
2nd weeding  80 80 80 80 80 0 
Harvesting  80 80 80 80 80 0 
Threshing 140 140 40 140 140 0 
Winnowing 80 80 40 80 80 0 
Bagging 0 30 0 0 30 0 
Transport 30 30 15 30 30 15 
TVC 1,238 1,270 983 858 890 203 
Gross margins 742 -190 997 1,122 190 1,777 
Source: Maliku Farmers’ Groups. 
Notes: 1. Figures in Kenyan Shillings per 90 kg bag of sorghum 
2. Planting and bird scaring are done by family members only (including children).  
3. Weeding and land clearing are done by two family members (husband and wife).  
4. There are no bagging costs for selling to Smart Logistics since they provide bags.  
 
Rate of Return on Investment 
Table 8 compares the rate of return for the three business scenarios. The results show that: 
1. Group farming is the most profitable method amongst the three. It gives a return of 
KS 8.75 on cash-cost basis which means that for every KS invested in group farming, 
the farmers get their shilling and an extra KS 8.75.Selling to brokers gives the least 
return (0.21). 
2. Farming individually then selling to brokers has a negative return (-0.15) on full-cost 
basis. For every shilling spent in production, the farmer loses 0.15 KS when he sells 
to the brokers.  
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Table 8: Rate of Return on Investment for sorghum production (2012) 
 Method Full-cost basis Cash-cost basis 
 Type of farming Individual Group  Individual  Group 
 Buyer Brokers SL SL Brokers SL SL 
Gross margin -190 742 997 190 1,122 1,717 
TVC 1,270 1,238 983 890 858 203 
Rate of return -0.15 0.6 1.01 0.21 1.31 8.75 
Source: Table 7 
6.4 Inclusion 
Maliku collection center 
When aggregation began in 2009, the number of growers in Maliku aggregation center was 
200-300 rising to 400-450 growers in 2010 and 500-550 growers in 2011. In 2012, Maliku 
aggregation center had 700-800 growers. In 2009 all group members were women but over 
time the proportion of male growers has increased, though their share remains low.  
Currently, members plant between four to six acres of sorghum. Of the total sorghum they 
produce, at least 15-20 90 kg bags are sold to Smart Logistics; the remainder is usually sold 
to brokers for immediate cash needs, or stored for household consumption. Of the 23 farmer 
groups that serve this aggregation Centre, 15 (65%) were all-women groups, 3 (13%) were 
all-male groups, and 5 (22%) were mixed groups. With an average of 20 members per 
group, the female group members outnumbered their male counterparts six to one. Young 
people (aged below 25) currently make up 15% of the participants. 
Constraints 
Growing demand for sorghum from EABL has increased price incentives for growers and the 
area planted to sorghum. According to one of the three groups interviewed, before contract 
farming in 2008, the market price was 3 KS/kg and the group farmed only three acres of 
sorghum, but in 2012 the group farmed 10 acres of sorghum. Sorghum has expanded at the 
expense of maize and beans, reflecting its growing popularity as a cash crop.  The majority 
of growers who sell to Smart Logistics are members of producer groups. Growers who are 
not group members produce low volumes of sorghum mainly for consumption and sell any 
surplus to brokers. 
Growers identified several challenges they faced in the business model. In order of 
importance, these were: 
1. Recurrent droughts (for the last four years they have experienced poor rains); 
2. Time lag in receiving payments; 
3. High production costs, especially for threshing and winnowing;  
4. Birds (quelea) reducing yields; and 
5. Lack of drying material. 
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7. Livelihoods and Enterprise Development (LEAD) Project, Uganda 
7.1 Design 
The project 
Livelihoods and Enterprises for Agricultural Development (LEAD) is a USAID-funded project 
to improve livelihoods for smallholders in rural Uganda. The project has a 5-year funding 
period (2009-2014). As well as targeting value-chains for coffee and maize, between 2009 
and 2012 LEAD also targeted the value-chain for finger millet. The idea originated with the 
CEO of Unga Mills Limited, which is also a member of the East African Grain Council 
(EAGC) in order to secure a supply of finger millet for Unga and to promote regional trade. 
Project activities were based in the Teso sub-region, the center of finger millet production in 
Uganda. The project targeted 17,000 millet growers in seven districts. After just two 
seasons, however, LEAD abandoned work with finger millet. In this case-study, we explore 
the reasons for the failure of the LEAD project to create a value-chain for finger millet in 
Uganda. 
The business model 
The LEAD business model involved four major partners.  
Unga Millers Ltd. is the oldest milling company in Kenya (founded 1891) and Kenya’s third 
biggest finger millet processor, after Mombasa Maize Millers and Pembe. Products include 
porridge (uji), pure finger millet flour, and animal/poultry feed made from by-products. Unga 
processes about 500 tons of finger millet per month. Full capacity is 700 tons/month. No 
finger millet is sourced from Kenya because it is either consumed on farm or made into local 
brew. Previous attempts by Unga to establish farmer groups in Kenya to supply finger millet 
proved unsuccessful. Consequently, all Unga’s finger millet is imported from Uganda and 
Tanzania.4 Unga’s advantage is that they have a history of flour production, a branded 
product, and see finger millet as a niche market.  With ban on exports from Tanzania 
imposed in 2008n and the consequent increase in prices, sales of millet flour fell due to price 
resistance from consumers. 
In the LEAD model, Unga places a forward contract for supply of finger millet from Uganda 
and guarantees growers a floor price, which is 60 % of the market price. Unga is willing to 
set a floor price because it is the dominant producer in Kenya. Since there is no grain 
exchange to determine the price, the floor price is based on historical trends and Unga’s ‘gut’ 
feeling about the market. Unga pays for the finger millet at the time of purchase. In 2010, the 
contract was for 1000 t, rising to 4,000 t in 2012 and 6,000 t in 2013. Informally, Unga 
agreed to take all the finger millet it could get. 
The LEAD project plays three roles: First, LEAD contracts Producer Organizations (POs) to 
produce and sell the required volume of finger millet to Unga. LEAD works with 11,000 POs 
 
4
 In January 2008, Tanzania banned export of cereals (including finger millet) in response to high food 
prices. The ban was lifted in April 2010. According to Unga Mills, this led to a 60 % rise in the price 
of finger millet.  
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in Uganda, with an average of 25 farmers in each PO. Focus is on staple food crops, 
including maize, sorghum, and millet. However, growers are not forced to sell their finger 
millet to Unga. Second, LEAD provided training to POs in millet production using Farmer 
Field Schools (FFS) and in collective marketing.  After one year, the POS graduate and are 
run by trained lead farmers. LEAD also links the POs to input suppliers like Victoria Seed, 
and with seed traders. The POs also do trials of finger miller with researchers at Serere. 
They grow Seremi 1 and Seremi 2 finger millet varieties supplied by Victoria Seeds, a private 
seed company in Uganda. Third, LEAD facilitated a Memorandum of Understanding 
between Buyer, seller, the Bank, and LEAD. LEAD negotiated the “structured trade facility” 
provided by Equity Bank.  
The World Food Programme (WFP) provided storage for finger millet in its Gulu 
warehouse. In 2009, only WFP had licensed warehouses. These are “licensed” because 
they meet certain standards and have insurance. The license issued by the Ugandan 
Commodity Exchange (UCE).  The warehouse cleans, dries, bags, and labels the finger 
millet and makes sure that it meets Unga’s quality specifications. As part of the UCE, the 
warehouse is licensed to issue receipts.  
Equity Bank is Kenya’s largest bank in terms of market penetration and recently extended 
operations into Uganda by buying Uganda Microfinance Ltd. In the LEAD business model, 
Equity Bank provides a “structured trade facility” i.e. a loan based on the quantity deposited 
in the warehouse. Hence the commodity is the collateral for the loan. After the warehouse 
issues a warehouse receipt, Equity Bank advances 60 % of the floor price to the POs, which 
then distribute this to their members. After Unga pays for the finger millet, Equity Bank 
deducts the advance paid to growers, its fees and interest, and warehouse fees from the 
Unga payment, and pays the balance to the POs. The POs then distribute the net payments 
to their members. 
7.2 Profitability 
Unga Millers Ltd 
Table 9 shows the costs for Unga Millers. The price of finger millet after transport from field 
to warehouse averaged 566,000 UGX/ton. Warehouse storage (including offloading, 
weighing, cleaning, etc.) added 36,222 UGX/ton. The cost of shipping finger millet from 
Uganda to Nairobi (including rail costs, customs clearing, etc.) averaged 237,028 UGX/ton. 
The C&F price of finger millet in Nairobi averaged 839,250 UGX/ton.  
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Figure 5: LEAD Project Business Model 
Source: LEAD (2009). 
Growers 
Profitability for finger millet growers was estimated by LEAD at 16,000 UGX per 90 kg bag 
(Table 10). The cost-benefit ratio was 1.46. Of total production costs, inputs accounted for 
9,702 UGX/bag (28 %), labour accounted for 24,300 (70 %), and transport from farm to 
warehouse 900 UGX/bag for 34,002 UGX/bag (2%). Labour costs for post-harvest were half 
of total labour costs. 
Although selling finger millet through the LEAD Project was profitable for growers, the sale to 
Unga is based upon a contract price of $ 375-425 per t C&F Nairobi. As soon as the harvest 
period is over, however, millet prices increase rapidly with demand from local brewers. In 
2009, for example, the millet price rose to 1,150 UGX/kg (+/- $ 500mt) with no requirement 
for quality / export documentation / transport (Perline, 2009: 29-30). With a price of 1,150 
UGX/kg, the profitability for growers rose to 68,598 UGX per 90 kg bag compared to 16,038 
UGX per 90 kg bag selling to Unga Millers. Thus, the benefit from the increase in production 
accrued primarily to Unga Millers Ltd, which purchased millet for cash immediately after 
harvest before prices rose. 
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Table 9: Unga Mills Ltd finger millet margins (2009)5 
Per ton (farm to store) Total cost (UGX/t)  Percent  
Off truck to store price                             566,000  67.44 
Truck to scale                                 2,000  0.24 
Weighing/Tallying                                 2,000  0.24 
Scale to stack                                 2,000  0.24 
Raw material to cleaner                                 2,000  0.24 
Operating Cleaner                               12,000  1.43 
Bags 90 kg                                 7,222  0.86 
Weighing                                 2,000  0.24 
Stitching                                 2,000  0.24 
Cleaner to stack                                 2,000  0.24 
Weight loss                                          -    
Fumigation                                 3,000  0.36 
In store                             602,222  71.76 
Per ton (shipment to Nairobi)     
Ex store                             602,222  71.76 
Loading/offloading                                 2,250  0.27 
Transport to rail                               11,250  1.34 
Handling     
COMESA certificate                                       25  0.00 
Phytosanitary certificate                                       10  0.00 
Certificate of origin                                       25  0.00 
Clearing agent                                  1,125  0.13 
Exporters margin                                  6,169  0.74 
Estimated FOB Uganda                              623,076  74.24 
Transport to Nairobi (rail)                                76,500  9.12 
C&F Nairobi                              839,250  100.00 
Per 90 kg bag 75,540  
Source: Reworked from Perline (2009)   
  
 
5
 Figures are Ugandan Shillings per ton of finger millet (exchange rate for 1 US$ to UGX= 2000-in 
yr2009) 
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Table 10: Partial budget for finger millet in Uganda, 2009  
Revenues (UGX) Yield (kg)                             90  
  Price (UGX/kg)                           566  
  Gross benefits                     50,940  
Costs (UGX)     
Materials Seed                           792  
  Fertilizer                       4,860  
  Pre-ploughing herbicides                       4,050  
  Subtotal                       9,702  
Labour Ploughing                       9,900  
  Applying herbicides                           900  
  Planting                       2,250  
  Weeding                       2,250  
  Bird scaring                       1,800  
  Harvesting and threshing                       2,700  
  Drying and cleaning                       2,700  
  Transport to store                           900  
  Packing                           900  
  Subtotal 24,300                     
  Transport to collection store                           900  
Total costs                       34,902  
Net benefits   16,038  
Benefit-cost ratio   1.46  
Source: Reworked from Perline (2009)  
Note: Figures in Ugandan shillings (UGX) per 90 kg bag 
7.3 Inclusion 
The LEAD M&E database provided information for 37 producer organizations in Bukedea 
and Kumi districts linked to the finger millet value chain. The total membership was 847 
members, of whom 383 members (45 %) were female. Of these 847 members, 527 (62 %) 
were finger millet growers. No figures were available for the share of male and female 
farmers growing finger millet, or the average quantity sold per grower. 
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8. Comparative Performance 
In this section we evaluate the performance of these three business models in terms of their 
design, profitability, and inclusiveness. 
8.1 Design 
Table 11 compares the three case-studies along two axes: the business model (Figure 1), 
and the main driver in the business model (Table 1). 
Table 11: Comparison of case studies  
Business Model / 
Driver 
2 3 4 5 
Individual 
Smallholders in 
Spot Markets 
Organized 
Smallholders in 
Spot Markets 
Contract 
Farming 
Integrated 
Agribusiness 
Producer-driven  Lesiolo Grain 
Handlers Ltd. 
  
Buyer-driven   Smart Logistic 
Solutions Ltd. 
 
Intermediary-
driven 
  Livelihood and 
Enterprise 
Development 
(LEAD) 
 
Lesiolo Grain Handlers Ltd 
The WRS operated by LGHL fits Model 3, where organized smallholders sell in spot 
markets. Smallholders may use the WRS individually but, as we have seen, organized 
smallholders have an advantage because they can meet the threshold for storage (10 t) and 
have lower transaction costs.  
The weakness of this design is that it is producer-driven. Performance depends on the ability 
and willingness of growers to use the WRS. Unfortunately, experience so far suggests that 
this has not been forthcoming. In 2011, LGHL stored approximately 80,000 t of grain, of 
which 50,000 t (63 %) was barley, 20,000 t (25%) was wheat, and 10,000 t (12%) was 
maize. No sorghum or millet was stored. The WRS operates only for wheat and maize.  Of 
the 30,000 t of wheat and maize stored, only 800 t (3 %) entered the WRS. Most of this 
came from three clients:   
1. Gogar Farm, Kabarak, a large commercial grower. 
2. Menengai Feed Lots, growers but also traders buying from smallholders.   
3. Five farmer groups, averaging 10 members each, who deposited 600 t.   
Depositors only use the WRS if they require cash to meet immediate financial obligations. 
However, the majority of clients depositing grain require only storage. Most clients storing 
grain are not growers but traders who sell when prices rise. The 600 t entering the WRS 
from five farmer groups is too large a quantity to represent own production. This suggests 
that these farmer groups also operate as traders, buying grain from other smallholders after 
harvest. The small number of farmer groups using the WRS reflects barriers to access faced 
by smallholders. As we have seen, these include the minimum threshold required, distance 
from the warehouse, and lack of knowledge about how the system operates. 
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Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd 
Smart Logistics uses a Contract Farming model, in which organized groups (COBOs) are 
supplied with seed and technical advice, receives a fixed price, and delivers the crop for 
bulking and delivery to the buyer. This has proved a robust design. Within a short period of 
time, it has allowed Smart Logistics to expand its scale of operations, invest in infrastructure, 
and increase participation from sorghum growers.  
The strength of this design is that it is buyer-driven. Sorghum is used as an adjunct with 
barley to produce malted beer, and to produce un-malted sorghum beer. Since malted beer 
in Kenya is heavily taxed, un-malted sorghum beer is cheaper than malted beer made from 
barley. This allows EABL to market sorghum beer for consumers wishing to ‘trade-up’ from 
traditional home brews. The market for sorghum beer in Kenya is large, and growing. EAML 
estimated its current demand for sorghum for beer at 36,000 tons. Of this, the greatest 
demand was in Kenya (25,000 t), followed by Uganda (8,000 t) and Tanzania (3,000 t). 
Demand is expected to increase in future. By 2015, EAML targets a demand of 45,000 t of 
sorghum from Kenya only. To date, EABL has not been able to meet its demand for 
sorghum. In 2011, EAML only acquired 17,000 t of sorghum for EABL, which was 8,000 t 
short of the target demand of 25,000 t. Of this, only 4,000 t (24 %) came from Kenya and the 
rest from Tanzania and Uganda. Large, commercial farms in Kenya prefer growing barley or 
wheat to sorghum, because of the risk of yield losses from birds and the high cost of weed 
management. Thus, there is a strong business case for EAML to buy locally (avoiding import 
taxes) and buy from smallholders.  
The weakness of the design is that contracts are non-enforceable. Smart Logistics contracts 
with producer groups to buy not a specified quantity of sorghum, but as much sorghum as 
they can produce and are willing to sell. However, the quantity of sorghum supplied is well 
below that which Smart Logistics has contracted to supply to EAML. For example, in 2011 
Smart Logistics supplied only 2,000 t, or 12 % of the total sorghum purchased by EAML.  
Non-enforcement of contracts with growers reflects the role of sorghum in the farming 
system. Although there is some side-selling of sorghum by producer groups to traders (who 
pay cash up-front), the main reason for low and variable supply is that sorghum is so 
important for household food security.  
 
Like many other farmers, Munyau says it does not make sense to sell her grain when the 
countryside is expecting drought in the next few months. "I will not go begging for food and 
alms from humanitarian organizations for my children to eat… That is why I will make sure 
that I have at least three bags of sorghum in my house at any time." (Esipisu, 2011). 
The LEAD project 
Like Smart Logistics, the LEAD project also used a Contract Farming model. However, the 
LEAD business model proved unworkable. Despite strong market demand for finger millet, 
the LEAD model never succeeded in delivering finger millet to Unga Mills Ltd. The 
explanation for this failure lies in the driver of the business model. 
The LEAD project was intermediary-driven. The original vision for LEAD was buyer-driven, 
and determined by the need by Unga Millers Ltd to assure its supply of finger millet. The 
Inclusive Business Models for Sorghum and Millets: Three Case Studies  
 
                                                                            ICRISAT - Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 25 
original business plan envisaged production by a nucleus estate that would sub-contract 
smallholder out-growers. However, Unga Mills was only one partner in the project, which 
was managed by a consultancy reporting to USAID. Two decisions made by the LEAD 
management team resulted in a very different business model. 
First, LEAD decided to use WFP warehouses for storage. Unfortunately, WFP headquarters 
in Rome would not agree to a legally binding contract for receipt of the finger millet, because 
of the risk of losses when the millet was sold. This ruled out a partnership with Equity Bank, 
which required a contract with WFP before it could provide credit to POs. This decision was 
probably made because (1) WFP had the only licensed storage warehouses in Uganda, and 
was licensed to issue warehouse receipts and (2) WFP is the single-largest buyer of quality 
grain in Uganda under its Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative, which links small farmers to 
domestic and regional markets (3) the P4P initiative was also financed by USAID, which is 
the largest single donor to the WFP. The result of this decision was to delay the production 
of finger millet by one year. Inspired International, a private company, was then contracted to 
set up a standard forward contract with Equity Bank.  
Second, LEAD decided to contract Cereals Uganda Ltd as the grantee that would bulk and 
store finger millet produced by farmer groups. Originally, LEAD was conceived as a 
competitive award that would be granted to a private company willing to invest in finger millet 
production. Although several large Ugandan companies expressed interest, the grant was 
awarded to Cereal Uganda Ltd, a small company based in Kumi, but with close links to 
WFP. Cereals Uganda was contracted to buy and install drying and processing equipment 
for licensed warehouses in Torero and Busia, which are close to the Kenya border. 
However, Cereals Uganda Ltd was unable to complete construction of the warehouses. The 
result was that no finger millet was stored for delivery to Unga Millers through the LEAD 
project.  
8.2 Profitability 
Because of differences between, years, crops, and countries, we cannot compare the 
relative profitability of each business model for growers. However, Figure 6 shows that: 
1. The WRS model was profitable for maize growers, compared to the alternatives of 
selling grain immediately after harvest or storing on-farm for two months. Seasonal 
price changes for sorghum are lower than for maize, which can double in price in the 
six months after harvest.  
2. The seasonal price rise for sorghum (21 %) is much lower than for maize (100 % 
plus). Consequently, there is little incentive for sorghum or millet growers to use the 
WRS. However, on-farm storage for two months would benefit growers.  
3. The Smart Logistics model was more profitable for growers than selling to brokers 
immediately after harvest. Buying prices for Smart Logistics were six-seven times 
higher than spot market prices.  
4. The LEAD model was profitable for growers, but less profitable than storing until 
demand from local brewers raised prices. However, selling immediately after harvest 
to Unga Mills is probably more profitable than selling to brokers. Unfortunately, we 
have no data on the prices paid by brokers at harvest. 
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Figure 6:  Profitability of three business models for growers6 
The three case studies show no clear link between profitability and the performance of the 
business model. Although the WRS is highly profitable for maize growers, LGHL reported 
limited demand for this service. Similarly, although selling finger millet to Unga Millers Ltd 
was profitable for growers, the design of the business model made it unworkable. In the case 
of Smart Logistics Ltd, the business model is profitable, and this has increased the volume of 
sorghum produced and offered for sale. However, profitability is only one factor determining 
the performance of the business model. The design of the Smart Logistics model, which is 
market-driven, is equally important. Profitability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for a successful business model. 
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8.3 Inclusion 
All three business models are inclusive, in the sense that they involved participation by 
smallholders rather than commercial growers, and involved participation by women. The 
participation rate for women in the study of the WRS by Mutai (2011) was 38 %,  65 % of the 
farmer groups supplying Smart Logistics were all-women groups, and 45 % of the members 
of the Producer Organizations supplying finger millet were women. However, smallholders 
are not a homogeneous group, and the quantity of sorghum or millet supplied may vary 
considerably from farmer to farmer. Unfortunately, we lack information on the average 
quantity supplied per grower. This information is essential to establish the extent to which 
poorer smallholders participate.  
Overall, the results suggest that inclusion depends on whether smallholders are members of 
producer groups. All three business models depend on the existence of farmer groups, 
either to reach the minimum threshold required for storage (LGHL), for collective production 
of the crop (Smart Logistics), or for provision of inputs and bulking to reduce transaction 
costs (Smart Logistics, the LEAD project). 
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Appendix 1: List of persons met or contacted  
No. Name Position 
1 Dale Wiest Operations Manager Unga Mills Ltd.  
2 Leah Tuitoek Procurement Manager, Unga Mills Ltd 
3 John Fitzgerald Financial Manager, LEAD 
4 Peter Wathum M&E, LEAD 
5 Gaudensia Kenyangi Agricultural Development Specialist, USAID, Uganda 
6 Steve Humphries Staple Foods Component Leader, USAID/COMPETE, Nairobi 
7 David Kinuthia Agribusiness Manager, EABL 
8 Peter Wanjohi Sales Assistant, CIMBRIA East Africa Ltd (grain silos) 
9 Marcel Wambua Head of Finance, Lesiolo Grain Handlers Ltd 
10 Julius Mutai formerly Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Egerton University 
11 Rose Mutuku CEO, Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd 
12 Sylvester Ndeda Sorghum project manager, EAML 
13 Paul Muthangya International Coordinator, EUCORD 
14 Gideon Matandi Farmer, Wendo wa maliku Self Help Group 
15 Eunice Mutethya Farmer, Walanyo Self Help Group 
16 Musangi Mwaniki Farmer, Walanyo Self Help Group 
17 Regina Sammy Farmer, Kalimani Self Help Group 
 
